Abstract

With improvement in smart grids through two-way communication, demand response (DR) has gained significant attention due to the inherent flexibility provided by shifting noncritical loads from peak periods to off-peak periods, which can greatly improve grid reliability and reduce cost of energy. Operators utilize DR to enhance operational flexibility and alleviate network congestion. However, the intelligent two-way communication is susceptible to cyber-attacks. This paper studies the benefits of DR in security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED) and then the vulnerability of the system to line overloads when cyber-attack targets DR signals. This paper proposes a false demand response signal and load measurement injection (FSMI) cyber-attack model that sends erroneous DR signals while hacking measurements to make the attack undetectable. Simulation results on the IEEE 24-bus system (i) demonstrate the cost-saving benefits of demand response, and (ii) show significant line overloads when the demand response signals are altered under an FSMI attack.

Index Terms

Controllable load curtailment, Cyber-attack, Demand response, Demand response signal redistribution, False data injection, False load measurement injection, Linear programming, Optimization, Security-constrained economic dispatch.

Cite this paper:

Mingjian Tuo, Arun Venkatesh Ramesh, and Xingpeng Li, “Benefits and Cyber-Vulnerability of Demand Response System in Real-Time Grid Operations”, IEEE Smart Grid Comm, Nov. 2020, Tempe, AZ, USA.